Understanding expert practices in order to control expert activities: The case of trading

Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions. We first identify the limits of traditional control patterns when the managing the activities of experts is at stake. Hyperspecialization, which is the ability to act within different logics and multiple time horizons, suggests that multidimensional representations of these activities be adopted and made explicit, which has the potential to prevent such activities from turning problematic. By examining bank risks and conducting additional interviews with actors from bank trading services, we recommend that multiple components of complexity be preserved when dealing with expert‐related operational risks, instead of reducing this complexity to a single concept. Such an approach implies to turn back expertise against itself. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intellectual capital reporting practices in an Islamic bank: A case study

Given the nature and importance of Islamic banks in recent times, we can expect them to have significant intellectual capital anchored in their Sharia‐based knowledge and expertise. However, we know very little or nothing about how and why intellectual capital‐related information is provided in their corporate reports. We fill this gap in our existing knowledge of the field with a view to enhance relevant literature. As far as we know, this article is one of the earliest exploratory attempts to examine intellectual capital reporting practices of an Islamic bank. We have undertaken a longitudinal (2001–2015) case study related to the intellectual capital reporting practices of an Islamic bank. Key results include significant rise of intellectual capital reporting over time, dominance of internal capital‐related items in intellectual capital reporting profile and the dynamics of changes in intellectual capital reporting practices over time. Through an institutional theory lens, we explain that this is due to the changes in the external institutional environment and various intra‐organisational factors such as strong ethical culture, unique knowledge base (Sharia), and corporate governance regime.     

The Effect Of Advertising Content Control On Advertising Effectiveness In The Different Forced Exposure Circumstance

With advances in new technology, various formats of online advertising (e.g., in-stream video advertising) often force e-consumers to watch the advertisement during their goal-oriented activities, and this advertising interruption often makes them feel intruded upon and irritated. To reduce such negative reactions toward involuntary advertising exposures, this study examines whether offering e-consumers the option to choose advertising content can influence ad effectiveness in different degrees of forced exposure circumstance. Using a 2 (advertising content control: customization option vs. no option) × 2 (level of forced exposure: pre-rolls vs. rich media banners) factorial experiment, the researcher noted that advertising customization features generate a greater sense of relevance and increased advertising memory, which in turn may lead to more positive attitudes toward the ad regardless of the levels of forced exposure. The findings have theoretical and practical implications on the use of involuntary advertising interruptions in the web interface.     

基于水权交易和面源污染控制的农户灌溉施肥行为模型

将水权交易和面源污染控制有机结合,以种植面积、农业用水定额、污染物浓度为约束条件,运用边际分析方法建立农户灌溉施肥行为模型,分析水权交易和排污控制对农户行为的影响。结果表明:灌溉用水量与农作物价格成正相关,与交易水价和边际灌溉成本成负相关;一定范围内肥料施用量与农作物价格成正相关,与边际施肥成本或边际环境成本成负相关。模型证明,当农业用水定额内水权可交易时,水市场的存在和水价政策将激励农户减少灌水量,节约用水。     

内外融资对企业不同阶段创新投资的异质性效应——基于中国制造业上市公司的数据

根据创新价值链理论，将企业创新活动分为研究阶段（R）与开发阶段（D），探究内外源融资方式对企业不同创新阶段投资的异质性效应，为企业选择创新活动的融资渠道和政府设计精准支持企业创新政策提供参考。基于中国制造业上市公司数据实证研究发现：内源融资对企业研究投资有显著促进效应，对开发投资未产生显著促进作用；债权融资对研究投资和开发投资的作用均不显著；股权融资对研究投资的影响不显著，但对开发投资具有显著影响。内源融资对债权融资与研究投资、债权融资与开发投资的关系不具有调节效应；内源融资对股权融资与研究投资关系具有正向显著调节效应，对股权融资与开发投资的关系具有正向调整作用但不显著。     

Transboundary pollution externalities: Think globally,act locally?

We analyze the implications of transboundary pollution externalities on environmental policymaking in a spatial setting, in which pollution diffuses across the global spatial economy independently of the specific location in which it is originally generated. This framework gives rise to a simple regional optimal pollution control problem allowing us to compare the global and local solutions in which, respectively, the transboundary externality is and is not taken into account in the determination of the optimal policy by individual local policymakers. We show that it is not obvious that transboundary externalities are a source of inefficiency per se since this is strictly related to the spatial features of the initial distribution of pollution. If the initial pollution distribution is spatially homogeneous then the local and global solutions will coincide and thus no efficiency loss will arise from transboundary externalities, but if it is spatially heterogeneous the local solution will be suboptimal and thus a global approach to environmental problems will be needed to achieve efficiency. From a normative perspective, in this latter (and most realistic) case we also quantify the amount of policy intervention needed at local level in order to achieve the globally desirable goal of pollution eradication in the long run. Our conclusions hold true in a number of different settings, including situations in which the spatial domain is either bounded or unbounded, and situations in which macroeconomic–environmental feedback effects are taken into account.     

Building responsive supervision over smaller banks in Europe: an insight from the Principal-Agent perspective

Abstract

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is an administrative arrangement of national assistance to the ECB in exercising its exclusive supervisory competence. It sets two systems of assistance: ECB Direct Supervision (for large banks) and Indirect Supervision (for smaller and medium-sized banks) supervision. This paper analyzes dynamics between the ECB Banking Supervision as the principal and NCAs as its agents in the system of ECB Indirect Supervision. It identifies six formal (statutory) accountability and control mechanisms which are put at the ECB’s disposal to monitor the way how the NCAs carry SSM supervisory tasks when exercising the ECB’s exclusive supervisory competences under the SSM Regulation.     

Life insurance decisions under recursive utility

In this paper, we generalize recursive utility to include lifetime uncertainty and utility from bequest. The generalization applies to discrete-time as well as continuous-time recursive utility, and it is an important step forward in the development of recursive utility. We formalize the problem of optimal consumption, investment, and life insurance choice under recursive utility, and we state a verification theorem with a generalized Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Our generalization of recursive utility allows us to study optimal consumption, investment, and life insurance choice under separation of (market) risk aversion, elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, and elasticity of substitution between bequest and future utility. The separation gives rise to hump-shaped consumption patterns as observed in realized consumption.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.